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Abstract 
In this paper, we investigate the effect of euphoria on returns derived by Indian companies in 
their cross-border acquisitions. Cognitive legitimacy generated at the country level facilitated 
firms in deriving higher value from internationalization. In addition, overoptimism after the 
legitimacy-building event led to euphoria in financial markets and short-term abnormal 
returns. Hence we argue that the springboard effect created by legitimacy is short-lived, as 
euphoria fades away over time. Using cross-border and domestic acquisitions by Indian 
companies during 1999-2009, and controlling for fundamental factors, both financial and 
non-financial, we find support for our euphoria hypothesis. Because of overoptimism, Indian 
companies experienced short-term abnormal returns in their cross-border acquisitions in the 
few years following the legitimation process, but not in later years. 
Keywords. Cognitive legitimacy, euphoria effect, India, cross-border acquisitions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The last decade has seen a rapid internationalization of emerging-market (EM) firms 
(UNCTAD, 2011). In the global business environment, these EM firms face several issues in 
the nascent internationalization stage due to their linkages with their home country (Stillman, 
1974). One of the critical issues faced by multinational enterprises, often underscored in the 
literature, involves the establishment and maintenance of legitimacy in foreign markets 
(Klossek et al., 2012; Kostova and Zaheer, 1999; Liao and Yu, 2012). Legitimacy is central 
in the milieu of institutions that define the rules of the game in international markets 
(Ahlstrom et al., 2008; Davis et al., 2000), and firms need to achieve taken-for-grantedness in 
these foreign markets (Guillén and García-Canal, 2009; Luo and Tung, 2007). However, 
authors in international business research have struggled to explain why legitimacy created in 
the business environment has no discernible impact after the initial observation of the 
legitimacy-creating phenomenon. This paper addresses this issue by linking the observed 
negligible effect of legitimacy to the euphoria effect widely studied in other areas (Helwege 
and Liang, 2004; Mian and Sankaraguruswamy, 2008; Steib and Mohan, 1997). More 
specifically, we investigate this euphoria effect in the context of internationalization of Indian 
firms; i.e., how euphoria created in financial markets can generate abnormal returns for 
Indian companies in their foreign acquisitions and how this euphoria effect is short-lived. 
The lack of legitimacy in the host country has been identified as one of the costs of 
doing business abroad, referred to as liabilities of foreignness (Kostova and Zaheer, 1999; 
Zaheer, 1995). Since authors have emphasized the role of location in Dunning’s OLI 
paradigm (Asmussen et al., 2011; Dunning, 2009), liability of foreignness is considered to be 
both a country-level and firm-level construct (Beugelsdijk, 2011; Dunning and Lundan, 
2008). Indeed companies can overcome this liability of foreignness through both firm-
specific (or ownership-specific) advantages and location-specific advantages. Moreover, this 
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liability of foreignness impacts the returns of these companies. Thus, EM companies are 
required to cultivate legitimacy that will help them surmount drawbacks coupled with their 
country-of-origin and liability of foreignness (Bell et al., 2008; Klossek et al., 2012; Rugman 
and Verbeke, 2004). Similarly, authors have looked at the legitimization process of Indian 
companies in foreign markets (Pant and Ramachandran, 2012).    
From the domestic country perspective, there are good grounds for believing that 
legitimacy generated in emerging markets will influence the tradeoffs between domestic and 
overseas investments. This has implications at a macroeconomic level as companies need to 
choose whether they will invest within their country or engage in outward investment (Gubbi 
et al., 2010). Hence, it is important to examine the returns that these companies derive abroad 
vis-à-vis their domestic investments.  
Our paper focuses on the following unanswered questions: Do Indian firms accrue 
value for their shareholders if they internationalize after the legitimation process? Do these 
returns hold over a period of time, i.e., is there a degree of persistence in the legitimacy-
generated abnormal value or is it mainly driven by euphoria in financial markets? The 
legitimacy that we discuss in this paper is not grounded in firms but rather is in the air. 
Legitimacy is created in the global business environment and Indian companies leverage it. 
However such cognitive legitimacy brought about overoptimism, or euphoria, in financial 
markets and, like fragrance, it fades away after initial exuberance as Indian companies are 
unable to leverage it anymore.  
We contribute to the narrative on organizational legitimacy and internationalization in 
two ways. First, our study shows that legitimacy created in the global business environment 
can impel organizations from EM to create value for their shareholders via cross-border 
acquisitions. Second, we use the euphoria effect to explain the temporal limitations on the 
leverage of legitimacy in these cross-border acquisitions.  
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Cross-border and domestic acquisitions by Indian companies form the empirical 
context of our study. In their internationalization process, Indian companies traditionally 
entered foreign markets through greenfield investments. However, a growing number of 
Indian companies alter their mode of entry into foreign markets, now adopting inorganic 
growth through overseas acquisitions (Gubbi et al., 2010; Hattari and Rajan, 2010; Kumar, 
2008).1 We use the time period 1999-2009 to undertake our empirical analysis. This period 
has seen a built-up of internationalization process by Indian firms. As seen on Figure 1 (Panel 
A), the number and value of cross-border acquisitions have grown considerably since 2000. 
Half way through the period, a Goldman Sachs report (Goldman Sachs, 2003) was published, 
which we argue creates a window of opportunity through legitimacy for Indian firms in their 
overseas acquisitions. The fact that this report acted as a legitimacy-building event for Indian 
companies is justified by the literature, both academic and professional (Armijo, 2007; 
Bloomberg, 2003; Hult, 2009; Wansleben, 2013), and motivated by informal discussions with 
Indian businesses.2 Figure 1 (Panel B) shows the surge in cross-border deal announcements – 
and value – right after the publication of the report in October 2003. Thus, our choice of 
country and time window provides an excellent setting to investigate our hypotheses. While 
the contribution of this paper will be specific to the particular context of Indian companies, it 
represents a progression towards a better understanding of the process by which EM firms are 
able to overcome the liability of foreignness in international markets and how legitimacy that 
                                                 
1 The number of foreign acquisitions by Indian companies has risen from only three in 1992 to 2,195 in 2001 
UNCTAD (2011).  
2 Between January 2009 and December 2013, we conducted several interviews with stakeholders of two Indian 
companies, as well as one acquisitions consultant in India. Both companies had limited foreign investment 
activity before 2003, and there was an overall consensus among respondents that the Goldman Sachs report had 
a great impact on the perception of Indian companies in foreign markets, and hence the firms’ cross-border 
investment strategy. 
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is grounded in the external environment generates positive effects for companies only in 
period of euphoria.  
Figure 1. Number and value of cross-border acquisitions by Indian companies by 
announcement date 
Panel A. 2000-2009 
 
Panel B. 2002-2004 
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Source: Thomson One 
 
In the next section of the paper we formally develop our hypotheses using theory and 
empirical evidence on legitimacy and euphoria and follow it with details on data and 
methodology. Results of our analysis are presented in the subsequent part, and finally, we 
conclude with discussion of our results and avenues for future research. 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
In this paper, we focus on a legitimacy-creating event at the country-level and see 
how its impact trickles down to firm-level. This is consistent with the institutional approach 
of organizational legitimacy, i.e., the existence of an exogenous legitimacy-building event 
that can affect how people understand and evaluate organizations (Suchman, 1995). The idea 
is that Indian companies are able to gain credibility and comprehensibility in the global 
environment, in line with the cognitive definition of legitimacy (Palazzo and Scherer, 2006; 
Suchman, 1995).  Pant and Ramachandran (2012) also argue that Indian firms are able to 
achieve cognitive legitimacy in their cross-border operations through what they call empirical 
credibility. Focusing on the software services industry, they show that empirical credibility 
was enhanced by the industry’s focus on “compilation and dissemination of extensive 
statistics on software services firms that enabled stakeholders to develop credible images of 
the Indian software industry”. Moreover, they emphasize the importance of industry studies 
published by consulting firms such as McKinsey and Boston Consulting Group that have 
substantial referent power in the host country’s institutional environment.  
Similarly, our legitimacy-creating event for Indian acquirers is the publication of a 
Goldman Sachs report (Goldman Sachs, 2003) considered as the first study assessing the 
tremendous growth potential of India and other BRIC countries. The economic liberalization 
of several emerging economies in the East (Ahlstrom et al., 2008) and the arrival of new 
transition economies of Eastern Europe in the 1980s-1990s have created a buzz in the global 
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business environment. At that time, the idea that trade liberalization and other moves to free 
up markets would generate a growth take-off represented a hope rather than a well-founded 
expectation (Krugman, 1995). Moreover, liberalization policies might not necessarily 
encourage companies to go abroad, even if they can act as enablers (Nayyar, 2008).  
It was noted that prior to 2003 much of the excitement about the new members of the 
global order was relatively muted (Goldman Sachs, 2003). Most of these emerging 
economies were pertinent for cheap labor and raw material, among others factors (Miller et 
al., 2008b). These emerging economies were leveraged by developed-economy firms for their 
demographic dividends, with a large number of young people forming part of their 
sweatshops. Though in some developing countries it had generated disposable income and 
improved the quality of life for citizens, it had done very little otherwise.  
The Goldman Sachs report altered the world vision. The countries in the periphery of 
the global business community were suddenly catapulted to the center of world discussion 
(Goldman Sachs, 2003; Rasiah et al., 2010). As soon as the report went public, Bloomberg 
Businessweek published an article stating that “the provocative conclusions, which initially 
stemmed from a demographic study, are already attracting wide interest” (Bloomberg, 2003). 
Although the Goldman Sachs report equally praises all BRIC countries, we believe its impact 
was strongest for Indian companies. For instance, China was already more advanced in terms 
of reform process, financial liberalization, openness to foreign investment, and organizational 
legitimacy (Huang and Khanna, 2003; Purushothaman, 2004). We argue that this report at the 
end of 2003 provided the necessary momentum to these Indian firms to capture the 
imagination of world business markets, including their domestic financial markets. Similar to 
Pant and Ramachandran (2012), we believe that the 2003 Goldman Sachs report emphasized 
the challenges to international growth of Indian companies and helped Indian firms gain 
widespread international credibility. The important contribution of the Goldman Sachs report 
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was to develop powerful frames about challenges faced, capabilities developed, and 
opportunities available for Indian companies. The picture of cheap laborers milling away in 
some dingy low-overhead factory was replaced by newly rich and ready to spend consumers 
who had taste for top-end products. National champions like Haier, Lenovo and Tata Group 
went on cross-border spree (Bonaglia et al., 2007). Indeed a direct consequence of this 
exogenous legitimacy building is the sudden increase in outward foreign direct investment, 
and more specifically overseas acquisitions, from Indian companies (Gammeltoft, 2008; 
Kumar, 2008). 
In India, cross-border acquisitions increased dramatically after 2003, mostly to gain 
market access to developed countries (Rasiah et al., 2010). Other authors have commented on 
the fact that Indian cross-border acquisitions have picked up from the year 2003 (Kohli and 
Mann, 2012), although they have not explored the reasons for this growth in acquisitions. We 
argue that those companies choosing to internationalize were able to channelize cognitive 
legitimacy developed by this report in the international business environment and generate 
value in their inorganic growth. This gain in credibility should mostly benefit cross-border 
acquisitions. Hence, following previous studies (Gubbi et al., 2010; Moeller and 
Schlingemann, 2005) we define the cross-border effect as the difference between the average 
abnormal return of foreign acquisitions and the average abnormal return of domestic 
transactions. Based on previous discussion and definition, we expect a positive cross-border 
effect to exist only after the legitimacy-building event: 
Hypothesis 1. After Indian firms gained cognitive legitimacy in the global environment, 
they experienced greater abnormal returns from their cross-border acquisitions as 
compared to their domestic acquisitions. 
Some of these acquisitions have been very high profile and have led to a perception of 
value-generating propositions in Indian business world (Khanna and Palepu, 2010). This 
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could have also led to the creation of a euphoria effect in these initial acquisitions undertaken 
by Indian companies. Indeed, Indian companies prior to the fiscal policy liberalization and 
trade policy changes faced rather restrictive policies at home and could not invest in global 
markets (Gubbi et al., 2010). Hence, the Indian stock market rewarded pioneering cross-
border acquisitions with higher premium driven by a novelty factor and bullish investment 
environment. A euphoria effect exists when something is done for the first time in the market. 
The results of such new activities unascertainable by the market can generate substantial 
interest and excitement. There is evidence that the Goldman Sachs report created country-
wide euphoria, as suggested by an article from the Economic Times in 2008, “the euphoria 
generated over the growth potential of India may have its origin in a 2003 report put out by 
global investment bank Goldman Sachs” (Economic Times, 2008). But with time this effect 
subsides and the market reaction converges towards realistic expectations of the activity 
outcome.  
Such euphoria has been observed in other circumstances. For instance, authors have 
talked about the reunification euphoria in German stock markets after the reunification of 
East and West Germany (Brooks et al., 2005; Steib and Mohan, 1997; Sultan, 1995). Minsky 
(2008) has mentioned the cycle of overestimation of expected returns, i.e., a phase of intense 
euphoria and bandwagon effect followed by a period of profit taking and finally, the cycle is 
completed with the recognition that earlier expectations were unjustified.  
In the behavioural corporate finance literature, such euphoria exists when investors 
and/or managers exhibit overoptimism. Investor sentiment is when investors react to factors 
other than the value created by the corporate decision (e.g. merger, initial public offering, 
earnings announcement, stock splits, dividend payment). There is evidence that shareholder 
reaction to a corporate announcement is affected by investor sentiment, and that the stock 
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price sensitivity to good news is greater during high sentiment periods (Helwege and Liang, 
2004; Mian and Sankaraguruswamy, 2008).  
Manager optimism can take different forms, e.g. bidders succumb to hubris and 
acquire overpriced targets with limited worth for the acquiring company (Roll, 1986). 
Managers engage in a lax assessment of the target company and might underestimate the 
challenges of integration in overseas acquisitions. Overall, stock market bolstered 
acquisitions are fraught with overvaluations and unlikely to realize full value for the 
acquiring firms. This kind of exuberance can result in financial cycle related acquisitions 
(Lubatkin and Chatterjee, 1991; Pangarkar and Lie, 2004; Shleifer and Vishny, 2003). High-
equity market cycles are closely accompanied with positive economic outlook. During such 
high-equity market cycles, similar to the one witnessed in India after the publication of the 
Goldman Sachs report, managers pursue aggressive and risky acquisitions. All through the 
low-equity market cycle, managers act conservatively. They either resist from undertaking 
acquisitions or scale-down the price that they pay for their transactions (Pangarkar and Lie, 
2004).3 Thus the existence of euphoria in the home market (either from managers or from 
investors) will lead to an overestimation of expected returns in the short-run.  
Our euphoria argument is also consistent with neoclassical theory suggesting that the 
occurrence of acquisitions is a consequence of economic shocks (Harford, 2005; Mitchell and 
Mulherin, 1996). If we consider the Goldman Sachs report as a country-wide economic shock, 
such economic disturbance brings about an increase in share prices, which causes 
shareholders to update their expectations. Such shock potentially increases acquisition 
                                                 
3 It is important to note that aggressive acquisition activity is not necessarily driven by managers’ irrationality, 
as managers can be perfectly rational and engage in overpriced acquisitions simply to arbitrage the presence of 
investor sentiment in the market (Sheifer and Vishny 2003). Indeed as long as the perceived synergy of the 
acquisition is high enough, the deal is in the interest of the manager. 
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synergies and creates a hot market, implying that bidder stock prices are more likely to 
increase when a deal is announced in a market where recent acquisitions by other firms have 
been received well (Rosen, 2006). 
Finally, another argument for this aggressive cross-border activity from Indian 
companies is the pressure from global markets to internationalize. Firms that experience low 
growth opportunities or that nurse world-stage aspirations look at acquisitions as a 
mechanism to springboard themselves into global markets and derive higher growth 
opportunities (Kim et al., 2011; Luo and Tung, 2007). But faced with pressures to grow fast, 
access international markets or acquire strategic assets, bidders might undertake lower than 
optimal examination of target countries or companies and overvalue the acquisitions. Thus, 
due to overoptimism in their domestic market and external pressure to internationalize rapidly 
and acquire strategic resources, many managers resulted in overpaying their acquisitions as 
they were less inclined to scrutinize potential targets for synergies. As many of these post-
acquisition disasters are well-documented in the media, financial markets might be 
unenthusiastic to future overseas investments once the initial magic of cross-border 
acquisitions fades. 
Thus, this euphoria effect is a relevant matter in this discourse on cross-border 
premium that companies can generate on the stock market due to legitimacy generated in the 
business environment. Because of euphoria, we argue that investors and/or managers 
overreacted to the Goldman Sachs report and that abnormal returns owned from cross-border 
acquisitions existed only in the few years following the report. In other words, deals 
announced around 2004-2006 experienced higher abnormal returns than deals announced in 
later years.  
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Hypothesis 2. The euphoria effect is short-lived, i.e., Indian companies earned abnormal 
returns in their cross-border acquisitions only in the few years following the legitimacy-
building event. 
It is also possible that firms belonging to different sectors will behave differently 
under similar business conditions. It is also likely that firms in some sectors will be able to 
experience integration synergies and/or negative effects sooner than other sectors. For 
instance, it has been observed that Indian service sector firms gain the positive benefits of 
internationalization sooner than manufacturing firms due to quicker assimilation of social and 
relational capital due to service firms’ superior capabilities compared to manufacturing sector 
(Contractor et al., 2007). Similarly, authors have suggested that the initial profitability loss 
from internationalization of firms is higher for manufacturing firms as opposed to service 
sector firms. Also, prior to the liberalization of the Indian economy, several manufacturing 
firms experienced local monopoly effects and did not engage actively in technology 
upgradation and internationalization (Gubbi et al., 2010). Hence, it is possible that service 
firms in India have already created legitimacy for themselves in the foreign markets before 
the legitimacy-building event discussed in this paper. Manufacturing firms, on the other hand, 
could mostly benefit from this legitimation in global markets. Thus, it is pertinent to examine 
whether manufacturing firms experienced a greater euphoria effect:  
Hypothesis 3: Manufacturing firms will experience stronger euphoria effect after the 
legitimacy-building event compared to other sectors.  
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
We use Zephyr database to obtain data on Indian acquisitions from January 1999 to 
December 2009. We use three qualifying conditions for inclusion into our sample: the 
acquirer is listed on Bombay Stock Exchange, the acquirer acquires a majority stake in the 
target company and finally, the transaction is complete. In order to compute abnormal returns, 
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we collect data on daily stock returns and daily market returns from Thomson DataStream. 
The unification of Zephyr and DataStream databases generates our final sample which 
consists of 649 acquisitions by 314 different companies, including 385 domestic and 264 
cross-border deals. For the market portfolio, we use the index BSE-200 which represents the 
200 largest capitalizations on the Bombay Stock Exchange. From DataStream we also collect 
quarterly data on price-to-book ratio and market capitalization for our multivariate analysis.  
Dependent variable. We use cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) calculated over a 5-
day window around the announcement date to assess the short-term performance of 
acquisitions. This method is similar to extant literature which focuses on the short-term 
impact of acquisitions on acquirers (Cartwright and Schoenberg, 2006; Doukas and Kan, 
2006; Gubbi et al., 2010; Kohli and Mann, 2012; Markides and Ittner, 1994; Moeller and 
Schlingemann, 2005). This ex ante performance measure prior to the actual integration of the 
target has been demonstrated to link well with the ex post firm level outcomes (Haleblian et 
al., 2006; Kale et al., 2002; Pangarkar and Lie, 2004). Moreover, this measure is relatively 
unbiased compared with other measures, and invariant to differences in national accounting 
standards (Cording et al., 2008; Gubbi et al., 2010). 
Independent variables. We test our first hypothesis using a dummy variable, Cross-
Border, which takes value one if the acquirer takes over a foreign company, zero otherwise. 
We test for the significance of this variable in impacting announcement returns over two sub-
periods corresponding to the years before and after the 2003 Goldman Sachs report. We 
expect that in the post-legitimacy period (2004-2009) this variable will have a positive and 
significant impact, stronger than in the pre-legitimacy period (1999-2003). In order to test our 
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second hypothesis, we need a measure of euphoria.4 Since euphoria is related to 
overoptimism, we use relative trading volume (i.e., stock turnover) as a proxy for euphoria 
towards a particular acquirer. An abnormally high level of trading volume implies that 
investors are buying or selling the stock of the company in mass. If investors are particularly 
optimistic (pessimistic) about an acquisition, they will buy (sell) the stock, pushing its price 
up (down). Volume is then defined as the deviation of the acquirer’s stock trading volume in 
the month of the announcement from its 12-month average. To test our euphoria hypothesis 
on the total sample of domestic and cross-border acquisitions, we interact this Volume 
variable with the dummy Cross-Border. Indeed we expect that, after the publication of the 
Goldman Sachs report, investors were overoptimistic about cross-border acquisitions – as 
opposed to domestic acquisitions. This translates into higher abnormal returns for cross-
border deals when trading volume was particularly high, that is a positive coefficient for 
Volume × Cross-Border. We expect that in the post-legitimacy period this variable will have 
a positive and significant impact, stronger than in the pre-legitimacy period. We further test 
our euphoria hypothesis on a reduced sample of cross-border deals only, by creating three 
other interaction variables, Volume × 2004, Volume × 2005 and Volume × 2006. 2004, 2005 
and 2006 are year dummies taking into account potential lags in this euphoria effect. Based 
on our theoretical arguments, we anticipate that these coefficients will be decreasing both 
economically and statistically over the three years, and that the Volume coefficient (looking at 
the euphoria effect for all other years) will become insignificant. For our third hypothesis, we 
split the cross-border sample into manufacturing and services sectors and test for the 
                                                 
4 Authors have suggested that the elemental difficulty with the idea of euphoria is that it cannot be calculated 
directly, and this dilemma has long been acknowledged in financial research on sentiment (Archer and Smith 
2013).  
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significance of Volume, Volume × 2004, Volume × 2005 and Volume × 2006 in explaining 
abnormal returns. 
Control variables. To be able to isolate the euphoria effect in our data, we control for 
fundamental factors known to affect announcement returns. Several of these variables are 
used as proxies for legitimacy-building, accounting for firm valuation and learning on the 
part of the firms. Similar to other studies on internationalization, we control for firm-level, 
deal-level and target country-level characteristics. The Acquirer Age is defined as the 
difference between the year of acquisition and the year of incorporation of the firm (Sapienza 
et al., 2006). Since authors have indicated the impact of business group association on FDI 
(Popli and Sinha, 2014), we create a control variable Business Group which takes value 1 if 
the acquirer belongs to a business group. Three variables are constructed to control for the 
relative valuation of the acquiring firm. Book Value is calculated as the percentage change in 
acquirer’s book value of equity at the time of the announcement compared to previous year. 
Market Value is calculated as the percentage change in acquirer’s market capitalisation at 
announcement date relative to its 12-month average. Price-to-Book ratio is calculated as the 
acquirer’s market value of equity divided by its book value of equity (Lang et al., 1991; 
Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005). At the deal level, Deal Value is the value of the 
transaction in billion dollars (Madura and Wiant, 1994). Relative Size is the ratio of deal 
value to bidder market value of equity (Gubbi et al., 2010; Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005; 
Nicholson and Salaber, 2013). Percentage Acquired controls for the variation in ownership 
concentration (Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005; Nicholson and Salaber, 2013). Same 
Industry is a dummy which takes value one if both the acquirer and the target belong to the 
same industry group, zero otherwise (Denis et al., 2002; Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 2003). We also create a variable, Prior Experience, to indicate prior 
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acquisition experience of acquirers in our sample (Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005; 
Nicholson and Salaber, 2013).  
At the target country level, we use different  measures of economic and social 
distance between India and the target country (Ghemawat, 2001; Gubbi et al., 2010; Khanna 
et al., 2005; Rugman and Verbeke, 2004; Tsang and Yip, 2007). The dummy variable Same 
Language takes value one when both countries have the same official language (Brouthers, 
2002; Demirbag et al., 2007; Ronen and Shenkar, 1985). We also use a variable Forex to look 
at the impact of foreign exchange rate variation on announcement returns (Buckley et al., 
2012). Following Cakici et al. (1996), Eun et al. (1996) and Kang (1993), we calculate the 
relative strength of the exchange rate as the deviation of the foreign exchange rate at 
announcement date from its 12-month average. To control for foreign direct investment 
activity in India, we include a variable Inflow/Outflow which is the ratio of yearly inward 
investments to yearly outward investments from India (Buckley et al., 2012). Finally, we 
have also included a variable to indicate the inward FDI into India called IFDI. 
All these variables are fundamental factors that can explain the cross-section of 
cumulative abnormal returns and help rule out any rational explanation. These rational factors 
can be divided into “financial” and “non-financial” variables. Financial factors are related to 
firm valuation and include Book Value, Market Value, Price-to-Book, Relative Size, Deal 
Value, and Forex. Non-financial factors account for strategic and managerial explanations 
and include Acquirer Age, Percentage Acquired, Same Industry, Prior Experience, Business 
Group, Inflow/Outflow, and Same Language.  
We compute daily abnormal returns using a standard event study methodology 
(Cartwright and Schoenberg, 2006; Gubbi et al., 2010; Haleblian et al., 2006; McWilliams 
and Siegel, 1997; Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005). This methodology allows to test 
whether a specific event (the announcement of an acquisition) had a positive or negative 
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impact on shareholder wealth (Aybar and Ficici, 2009). The expected returns for each stock 
are estimated according to the market model (MacKinlay, 1997): 
,itmtiiit RR                         (1) 
where Rit is the daily return on the acquirer and Rmt is the daily return on the market portfolio. 
The estimation period runs from 90 to 30 days before the announcement date. The 
coefficients i and i thus obtained are used to forecast the abnormal returns over each 5-day 
event window. The difference between the actual return and the expected return from the 
market model gives the daily abnormal stock return: 
mtiiitit RRAR

  .         (2) 
We then calculate the cumulative abnormal return for each deal (CARi) by 
accumulating the daily abnormal returns over the 5-day event window [-2; +2]. 
As an alternative method to compute abnormal returns, we use the modified market 
model also used in previous event studies (Bouwman et al., 2009; Brown and Warner, 1985). 
Instead of estimating expected returns over a pre-announcement period, the modified market 
model proxies the normal return of company i on day t with the market return on that day.5 
We thus define abnormal returns for any day t as the difference between the bidder return and 
the market return: 
ARit = Rit – Rmt.          (3) 
We then test our hypotheses by assessing the cross-border effect using CARs in a 
univariate analysis; and regressing the CARs on our independent and control variables. For 
                                                 
5 As our sample includes several consecutive deals (i.e., the same company announcing different acquisitions 
within the same couple of months), we lose some deals by using a 60-day estimation period. Every time the 
estimation period for a particular transaction overlaps with a previous deal announcement, this transaction is 
discarded from the sample.  
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this last step, we run several cross-sectional regressions across various types of deals based 
on the following multivariate models: 
Hypothesis 1:  
  βΧBorder-CrossCAR 10i        (4) 
This model is run over the total sample of domestic and cross-border deals. X is a vector 
representing all control variables discussed above, excluding country-level variables. 
Hypotheses 2 and 3:  
  βΧBorderCrossVolumeVolumeCAR 210i       (5) 
This model is run over the total sample of domestic and cross-border deals. 
  βΧ2006Volume2005Volume2004VolumeVolumeCAR 43210i
  (6) 
This model is run over the sample of cross-border deals only; X here includes country-level 
variables. 
RESULTS 
The descriptive statistics and correlations between our variables are presented in 
Table 1. Panel A presents the statistics across all transactions (both domestic and cross-
border) whereas Panel B provides descriptive statistics for the sub-sample of cross-border 
deals only. With an average firm age of 35 years and a deviation of 24 years, our sample 
shows an eclectic mix of acquirers, some matured (e.g. Tata Group which is over a century 
old) and some quite young (e.g. ICICI Bank which was formed in the 1990s). In Panel B, the 
average CAR (1.8%) is much higher than in Panel A, suggesting that cross-border 
acquisitions on average earn higher abnormal returns than domestic acquisitions. However it 
is worth noting that the standard deviation of CARs is very close between both panels, 
implying that the variation in CARs is similar across domestic and cross-border acquisitions. 
Looking at the correlation between our variables, CAR is positively correlated with Cross-
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Border, Relative Size, and especially Volume. Cross-Border is also positively correlated with 
Business Group and Percentage Acquired. Across our control variables, no correlation 
coefficient is above 0.37, ensuring minimum multicollinearity issues in the regression 
analysis. For information, the top three target countries are OECD countries (the United 
States, the United Kingdom and Germany).  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
 
 
Panel A. Domestic and cross-border deals (n=222) 
                                         Mean S.D. 1   2 3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10   11 12 13   14   15 
1 CAR 0.001 0.059 1 
                         2 Acquirer 
Age 
35.57 24.31 -0.021  1                        
3 Business 
Group 
0.856 0.352 0.013  0.108 1                       
4 Cross-
Border 
0.482 0.501 0.273 *** -0.075 0.268 *** 1                     
5 Deal 
Value 
57.37 178.81 -0.173 *** 0.012 -0.131 * 0.033  1                   
6 Forex -0.001 0.051 0.067  -0.027 -0.027  0.160 ** 0.064  1                 
7 Prior 
Experience 
0.509 0.501 -0.186 *** 0.006 0.290 *** 0.172 ** 0.091  0.008  1               
8 Price-to-
Book 
3.891 3.962 -0.066  0.072 0.089  0.097  -0.052  -0.005  0.055  1             
9 Inflow/ 
Outflow 
2.730 3.468 0.034  -0.034 -0.117 * -0.145 ** -0.035  -0.114 * -0.148 ** -0.093  1           
10 Relative 
Size 
0.118 0.307 0.185 *** -0.043 -0.028  0.104  0.282 *** -0.043  -0.088  -0.158 ** 0.014  1         
11 Same 
Industry 
0.712 0.454 -0.112 * -0.020 -0.006  0.017  0.069  -0.057  -0.068  0.048  0.116 * 0.012  1       
12 Same 
Language 
0.838 0.369 -0.011  -0.033 -0.181 *** -0.456 *** 0.049  -0.021  -0.090  -0.008  0.088  0.001  -0.037 1      
13 Percentage 
Acquired 
0.793 0.298 0.081  0.024 0.010  0.305 *** 0.085  0.114 * -0.055  0.104  0.001  0.121 * 0.009 -0.036 1     
14 Book 
Value () 
0.265 0.429 0.059  -0.051 0.047  0.081  0.027  0.122 * -0.028  0.233 *** 0.069  -0.162 ** 0.053 0.000 0.163 ** 1   
15 Market 
Value () 
0.142 0.387 0.172 ** -0.014 -0.013  -0.022  -0.019  0.365 *** -0.093  0.013  0.174 *** 0.086  0.025 0.011 0.059  0.247 *** 1 
16 Volume 0.034 0.793 0.296 *** 0.086 0.091  -0.018  0.005  0.057  -0.041  -0.035  0.112 * 0.207 *** 0.017 -0.039 -0.118 * -0.066  0.239 
17 IFDI 19.26 14.19 -0.127 * -0.035 0.009  -0.056  0.054  -0.370 *** 0.071  0.060  -0.280 *** 0.098  -0.090 -0.045 -0.060  -0.071  -0.301 
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Panel B. Cross-border deals only (n=107) 
                     
                                   Mean S.D. 1   2   3   4   5   6 7   8   9   10 11   12   13 14   15 
1 CAR 0.018 0.064 1                          
2 Acquirer 
Age 
33.67 21.73 -0.045  1                        
3 Business 
Group 
0.953 0.212 -0.048  0.117  1                      
4 Deal 
Value 
63.54 199.46 -0.221 ** 0.168 * -0.260 *** 1                    
5 Forex 0.007 0.046 -0.022  0.020  -0.017  0.086  1                  
6 Prior 
Experience 
0.598 0.493 -0.300 *** 0.031  0.089  0.144  -0.003  1                
7 Price-to-
Book 
4.290 4.340 -0.218 ** 0.142  0.075  -0.099  0.101  0.108 1               
8 Inflow/ 
Outflow 
2.211 1.091 0.067  0.075  -0.090  -0.144  -0.400 *** 0.073 -0.073  1             
9 Relative 
Size 
0.151 0.399 0.265 *** 0.010  -0.160 * 0.360 *** -0.076  -0.103 -0.219 ** -0.102  1           
10 Same 
Industry 
0.720 0.451 -0.154  0.046  -0.040  0.121  -0.198 ** -0.087 0.085  0.153  -0.009  1         
11 Same 
Language 
0.664 0.475 0.171 * -0.122  -0.158  0.093  0.093  -0.019 0.054  0.112  0.061  -0.048 1        
12 Percentage 
Acquired 
0.887 0.223 0.015  0.145  -0.113  0.107  0.016  -0.034 0.127  -0.042  0.061  0.053 0.224 ** 1      
13 Book 
Value () 
0.301 0.511 0.044  0.030  0.087  -0.045  0.101  -0.037 0.269 *** -0.055  -0.231 ** 0.064 0.051  0.178 * 1    
14 Market 
Value () 
0.134 0.324 0.128  0.066  0.004  -0.032  0.245 ** -0.135 0.075  -0.143  0.107  -0.051 0.002  0.027  0.072 1   
15 Volume 0.019 0.669 0.393 *** 0.147  0.058  0.018  0.070  0.080 0.004  -0.108  0.349 *** -0.139 -0.091  -0.108  -0.142 0.172 * 1 
16 IFDI 18.43 12.71 -0.074  -0.100  -0.092  0.094  -0.100  -0.026 -0.059  -0.481 *** 0.210 ** -0.096 -0.127  0.146  -0.046 -0.088  -0.005 
 
† if p < 0.10, * if p < 0.05; ** if p < 0.01; *** if p < 0.001
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Cross-border effect. In order to test Hypothesis 1, we use both univariate and 
multivariate analyses and split our sample into two sub-periods: before the publication of the 
Goldman Sachs report (1999-2003) and after (2004-2009). Table 2 reports the results for the 
univariate analysis, calculating 5-day CARs using either the market model without estimation 
period (Panel A) and with a 60-day estimation period (Panel B). Although in Panel A the 
average cross-border CAR for 1999-2003 is almost twice the average CAR for 2004-2009, 
both are very similar (about 1.9%) when CAR is calculated using the market model with 
estimation period (Panel B). The cross-border effect is the difference between cross-border 
CAR and domestic CAR. In order to test for this cross-border effect, we perform a t-test 
comparing the average CARs of domestic and foreign acquisitions. The t-statistics show that 
the cross-border effect is significant only in the post-legitimacy period. Thus, we observe 
support for our first hypothesis as there is a significant difference between the abnormal 
returns obtained from foreign and domestic acquisitions during the period 2004-2009 (this 
difference is equal to 1.6% in Panel A, which is significant at the 1% level). We observe 
similar results for CAR with 60-day estimation period (Panel B) where the cross-border 
effect over 2004-2009 is lower (0.1%) but still significant at the 5% level. 
Table 2. Univariate Analysis (whole sample) 
Panel A. CAR without estimation perioda,b 
 cross-border domestic cross-border 
effectd 
t-stat 
 
1999-2003 3.074% 
n=42 
2.937% 
n=89 
0.137%  
 
0.10 
2004-2009 1.747% 
n=219 
0.138% 
n=291 
1.609% 2.76*** 
 
Panel B. CAR with estimation perioda,c 
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 cross-border domestic cross-border 
effectd 
t-stat 
 
1999-2003 1.927% 
n=35 
2.075% 
n=80 
-0.148% -0.09 
 
2004-2009 1.911% 
n=157 
1.815% 
n=235 
0.097% 2.55** 
 
a CAR is the 5-day cumulative abnormal return relative to the BSE-200 index and averaged 
across deals. 
b CAR is calculated using the modified market model without estimation period. 
c CAR is calculated using the market model with a 60-day estimation period. 
d The cross-border effect is the difference between cross-border CAR and domestic CAR.  
** p<0.05 
*** p<0.01 
As a robustness check, we create a matched sample of deals based on three criteria: 
both domestic and cross-border deals have to be generated from the same bidder’s industry; 
the announcement dates of both deals have to be less than one year apart, and the difference 
between both bidder’s size has to be as small as possible (Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005). 
Results for the matched sample are presented in Table 3 and are similar to those shown in 
Table 2, i.e., we observe a cross-border effect only after the legitimacy-generating event. The 
2004-2009 cross-border effect is even higher than for the whole sample (1.71% in Panel A 
and 2.13% in Panel B). 
Table 3. Univariate Analysis (matched sample) 
 
Panel A. Without estimation perioda,b 
 cross-border domestic cross-border 
effectd 
t-stat 
 
1999-2003 3.46% 
n=36 
2.23% 
n=37 
1.23% 0.72 
2004-2009 1.92% 0.21% 1.71% 2.46** 
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n=179 n=178 
Panel B. With estimation perioda,c 
 cross-border domestic cross-border 
effectd 
t-stat 
 
1999-2003 2.94% 
n=31 
1.05% 
n=31 
1.90% 1.18 
2004-2009 2.22% 
n=139 
0.09% 
n=146 
2.13% 2.62*** 
a CAR is the 5-day cumulative abnormal return relative to the BSE-200 index and averaged 
across deals. 
b CAR is calculated using the modified market model without estimation period. 
c CAR is calculated using the market model with a 60-day estimation period. 
d The cross-border effect is the difference between cross-border CAR and domestic CAR.  
** p<0.05 
*** p<0.01 
In order to test Hypothesis 1 in a multivariate framework, we regress individual 
CARs on the explanatory and control variables using OLS method. Several observations 
were dropped due to missing values. Results with robust standard errors obtained using 
Huber-White sandwich estimator are provided in Table 4 models (1) and (4). The variable of 
interest, Cross-Border, has a strong impact on abnormal returns in the post-legitimacy period 
but not in the pre-legitimacy period. Prior to 2003, the Cross-Border coefficient is not 
statistically significant; whereas post-2003, the coefficient is significant at 0.1% level. This 
result is consistent with findings from Tables 2 and 3, and strongly supports our first 
hypothesis, that is cross-border acquisitions by Indian companies earn higher announcement 
returns than domestic acquisitions in the post-legitimacy period. It is worth noting that the 
control variables – accounting for fundamental factors – behave differently across the two 
sub-periods. For instance, the two variables measuring the relative valuation of the acquirer 
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(Book Value and Market Value) have a negative impact on CAR in the first period and a 
positive impact in the second period – though none of the coefficients are statistically 
significant. Deal Value, Same Industry, and Prior Experience have no significant effect on 
CAR during 1999-2003 but have a significant (negative) impact during 2004-2009. 
Euphoria effect. The other models in Table 4 provide a preliminary test for 
Hypothesis 2 on the total sample of domestic and cross-border acquisitions. In models (2) 
and (5), the cross-border effect is still stronger in the post-legitimacy period, even when 
accounting for abnormal trading volume. The Volume variable has a positive impact on CAR 
in both periods, although its statistical significance is higher after 2003. The positive 
coefficient is consistent with overoptimism in financial markets, i.e., investors react 
positively to the acquisition’s announcement by buying the stock of the company in mass, 
creating short-term abnormal returns not explained by other fundamental factors. Models (3) 
and (6) allow us to test whether such overoptimism was higher for cross-border deals than for 
domestic ones. The variable of interest, Volume × Cross-Border, has a stronger impact on 
abnormal returns in the post-legitimacy period compared to the pre-legitimacy period. Prior 
to 2003, the Volume × Cross-Border coefficient is not significant, whereas it is strongly 
significant (at the 1% level) post-2003. Interestingly, Volume is not significant anymore in 
model (6), suggesting that the overoptimism observed after the legitimacy-building event 
(model 5) is entirely directed towards cross-border acquisitions. These findings provide 
preliminary support to our euphoria hypothesis, that is cross-border acquisitions earned 
higher abnormal returns than domestic acquisitions in the post-legitimacy period because of 
overoptimism.  
Finally, we observe that most of our control variables have negative or no impact on 
5-day CARs. The variable with the most significant impact (especially during 2004-2009) is 
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Deal Value, that is acquirers are penalized for targeting large companies. Interestingly, Price-
to-Book ratio has a significant impact during 1999-2003 but not during 2004-2009. On the 
contrary, Same Industry and Prior Experience of acquirer negatively impact CARs only in 
the second period.  
  
 28 
Table 4. Results of OLS regression with 5-day window cumulative abnormal returns 
(Sample of domestic and cross-border deals) 
 
 
1999-2003 
 
2004-2009 
 
(1)   (2)   (3)   
 
(4)   (5)   (6)   
Cross-Border 0.0269 
 
0.0291 † 
   
0.0380 *** 0.0362 *** 
  
 
(0.0161) 
 
(0.0155) 
    
(0.0082) 
 
(0.0083) 
   Volume 
  
0.0171 * 0.0190 ** 
   
0.0232 *** 0.0005 
 
   
(0.0067) 
 
(0.0063) 
    
(0.0068) 
 
(0.0097) 
 Volume × Cross-Border 
    
-0.0187 
      
0.0432 ** 
     
(0.0161) 
      
(0.0129) 
 Acquirer Age -0.0003 
 
-0.0005 * -0.0006 * 
 
0.0001 
 
0.0001 
 
-0.0001 
 
 
(0.0002) 
 
(0.0002) 
 
(0.0003) 
  
(0.0002) 
 
(0.0002) 
 
(0.0002) 
 Book Value -0.0120 
 
-0.0183 
 
-0.0235 
  
0.0123 
 
0.0149 
 
0.0172 
 
 
(0.0196) 
 
(0.0204) 
 
(0.0197) 
  
(0.0128) 
 
(0.0125) 
 
(0.013) 
 Market Value -0.0020 
 
0.0186 
 
0.0155 
  
0.0143 
 
0.0049 
 
0.0035 
 
 
(0.0281) 
 
(0.019) 
 
(0.0163) 
  
(0.0133) 
 
(0.0132) 
 
(0.0137) 
 Price-to-Book -0.4672 † -0.5505 * -0.4911 * 
 
-0.1000 
 
-0.0814 
 
-0.0906 
 
 
(0.2561) 
 
(0.2386) 
 
(0.2033) 
  
(0.1004) 
 
(0.1051) 
 
(0.0889) 
 Relative Size -0.1316 * -0.0641 
 
-0.0807 
  
0.0427 † 0.0300 † 0.0272 † 
 
(0.0649) 
 
(0.0582) 
 
(0.0584) 
  
(0.0231) 
 
(0.017) 
 
(0.0147) 
 Deal Value -0.0003 
 
-0.0004 * -0.0004 * 
 
-0.0001 ** -0.0001 *** -0.0001 *** 
 
(0.0002) 
 
(0.0002) 
 
(0.0002) 
  
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 Percentage Acquired 0.0140 
 
0.0371 † 0.0535 * 
 
-0.0102 
 
-0.0091 
 
0.0129 
 
 
(0.021) 
 
(0.0212) 
 
(0.0232) 
  
(0.0131) 
 
(0.0131) 
 
(0.0138) 
 Same Industry 0.0141 
 
0.0177 
 
0.0131 
  
-0.0202 * -0.0208 * -0.0173 * 
 
(0.0178) 
 
(0.0162) 
 
(0.0152) 
  
(0.0086) 
 
(0.0082) 
 
(0.0086) 
 Prior Experience -0.0217 
 
-0.0058 
 
0.0057 
  
-0.0186 * -0.0247 ** -0.0254 ** 
 
(0.0174) 
 
(0.0151) 
 
(0.0142) 
  
(0.0085) 
 
(0.0083) 
 
(0.0084) 
 Business Group -0.0108 
 
-0.0288 
 
-0.0245 
  
-0.0108 
 
-0.0075 
 
0.0084 
 
 
(0.0275) 
 
(0.0196) 
 
(0.0223) 
  
(0.0132) 
 
(0.0132) 
 
(0.0135) 
 Constant 0.0396 
 
0.0325 
 
0.0321 
  
0.0149 
 
0.0198 
 
0.0065 
 
 
(0.0305) 
 
(0.0257) 
 
(0.029) 
  
(0.0162) 
 
(0.016) 
 
(0.0175) 
       
R-squared 0.240 
 
0.505 
 
0.473 
  
0.248 
 
0.308 
 
0.280 
 Observations 50 
 
47 
 
47 
  
179 
 
175 
 
175 
  
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses, † if p < 0.10, * if p < 0.05; ** if p < 0.01; *** if p < 0.001 
Next, we investigate the temporal limitation of the euphoria effect, i.e., the fact that 
overoptimism towards cross-border acquisitions was concentrated in the few years following 
the Goldman Sachs report. Table 5 presents the yearly cross-border effect over 2000-2009 
using both the modified market model (Panel A) and the market model (Panel B). We use t-
test as before to examine the significance of the cross-border effect. This analysis of yearly 
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CARs shows that the cross-border effect was very strong in 2004 (4.16% 5-day abnormal 
return in Panel A) but does not exist beyond. Also, in 2004, investors did not reward on 
average companies that bought domestically. One explanation for this could be that as value 
was being generated in overseas acquisitions (Roll, 1986), bidders that invested in local 
markets were expected to succeed less than their globalizing counterparts. Though a mild 
cross-border effect is observed in 2009 (Panel A), this effect is no more significant when 
using a 60-day estimation period (Panel B).6  
Table 5. Yearly average of cumulative abnormal returns 
 
Panel A. Without estimation perioda,b 
 
cross-border domestic cross-border 
effectd 
t-stat 
  n= CAR n= CAR 
2000 5 5.74% 18 2.84% 2.90%  
2001 4 2.66% 12 7.66% -5.00%  
2002 9 2.87% 20 1.32% 1.55%  
2003 21 1.74% 34 2.01% -0.27%  
2004 22 3.83% 45 -0.33% 4.16% *** 
2005 38 1.75% 43 1.42% 0.33%   
2006 48 1.69% 40 0.58% 1.11%   
2007 53 2.34% 42 0.95% 1.40%   
2008 47 -0.31% 82 -0.45% 0.15%   
2009 10 3.68% 34 -1.60% 5.28% † 
 
Panel B. With Estimation perioda,c 
 
cross-border domestic cross-border 
effectd 
t-stat 
  n= CAR n= CAR 
2000 4 1.84% 16 2.04% -0.19%   
2001 4 -1.17% 12 6.44% -7.61%   
2002 6 1.73% 18 2.31% -0.58%   
2003 19 1.31% 29 0.36% 0.95%   
                                                 
6 There are fewer cross-border acquisitions in 2009 (only 10) and their relatively high average CAR is driven by 
one high-profile deal, the acquisition by IT solutions provider Softpro Systems of South Africa based Cura Risk 
Management software for $ 19 million in June 2009. 
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2004 15 4.04% 37 -1.17% 5.21% *** 
2005 24 1.44% 36 0.80% 0.64%   
2006 30 1.96% 32 0.02% 1.94%   
2007 44 2.73% 33 1.38% 1.35%   
2008 33 -0.62% 62 -0.41% -0.21%   
2009 10 4.23% 30 -0.16% 4.39%   
a CAR is the 5-day cumulative abnormal return relative to the BSE-200 index and averaged 
across deals. 
b CAR is calculated using the modified market model without estimation period. 
c CAR is calculated using the market model with a 60-day estimation period. 
d The cross-border effect is the difference between cross-border CAR and domestic CAR.  
† p<0.1  
*** p<0.001 
Results for the multivariate analysis on cross-border deals over the whole sample 
period (1999-2009), including Huber-White robust standard errors, are presented in Table 6. 
Reducing the sample to cross-border deals allows us to control for relevant country-level 
variables and hence increase the explanatory power of the model. In the first model, Volume 
is positive and highly significant, which indicates the existence of overoptimism towards 
cross-border deals without any consideration of timing. Thus, the variable Volume × 2004 
captures the short-term effect of euphoria on the CARs derived from acquisitions announced 
in 2004, i.e., just after the legitimacy event. We also test whether this euphoria effect still 
existed with 1-year and 2-year lags after the legitimacy event. In model (2), the coefficient 
for Volume × 2004 is positive and statistically significant (equal to 7.99%). Volume × 2005 
is positive although not significant; whereas, Volume × 2006 is positive and significant 
(equal to 3.59%), thus we detect a lagged effect of euphoria on acquisition returns. Most 
importantly, the Volume coefficient is halved when including the three interaction terms, and 
its significance decreases from 0.1% to 10%. These results support our short-term euphoria 
effect, that is shareholders are mostly overoptimistic about cross-border acquisitions after the 
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legitimacy event (over 2004-2006) but not so much before and/or after. The result is even 
stronger when looking only at manufacturing companies: the euphoria around cross-border 
acquisitions is mainly significant in 2004 (almost 11%), and to a lesser extent, in 2006 
(4.4%), whereas Volume becomes insignificant. We do not find any euphoria effect for 
service sector acquisitions, except for a mild effect in the year 2006. These findings are 
consistent with our Hypothesis 3. For manufacturing firms, which represent more than 60% 
of the cross-border sample, we observe that Deal Value, Price-to-Book ratio, Prior 
Experience and IFDI have a negative and significant effect on CARs; whereas Book Value 
and Same Language have a positive and significant impact.  
Table 6. Results of OLS regression with 5-day window cumulative abnormal returns (Sample of 
cross-border deals) 
  
 
All cross-border deals 
 
Manufacturing 
 
Services 
            
 (1)  (2)   (3)  (4)   (5)  (6)  
Volume 0.0378 *** 0.0194 † 
 
0.0471 *** 0.0221 
  
0.0331 
 
0.0243 
 
 
(0.0074) 
 
(0.0115) 
  
(0.0113) 
 
(0.0139) 
  
(0.0205) 
 
(0.0292) 
 Volume × 2004 
  
0.0799 ** 
   
0.1094 ** 
   
0.0667 
 
   
(0.0292) 
    
(0.0311) 
    
(0.3768) 
 Volume × 2005 
  
0.0220 
    
0.0079 
    
-0.0321 
 
   
(0.0233) 
    
(0.0456) 
    
(0.0501) 
 Volume × 2006 
  
0.0359 * 
   
0.0440 ** 
   
0.1100 * 
   
(0.0174) 
    
(0.0146) 
    
(0.049) 
 Acquirer Age 0.0000 
 
0.0000 
  
0.0001 
 
0.0002 
  
-0.0009 
 
-0.0011 
 
 
(0.0002) 
 
(0.0002) 
  
(0.0002) 
 
(0.0002) 
  
(0.0008) 
 
(0.001) 
 Book Value 0.0228 † 0.0192 
  
0.0401 ** 0.0412 ** 
 
0.0057 
 
0.0095 
 
 
(0.0132) 
 
(0.0137) 
  
(0.0139) 
 
(0.0132) 
  
(0.027) 
 
(0.0304) 
 Market Value 0.0007 
 
0.0065 
  
-0.0530 † -0.0499 
  
0.0191 
 
0.0169 
 
 
(0.0184) 
 
(0.0195) 
  
(0.0279) 
 
(0.0334) 
  
(0.0409) 
 
(0.0423) 
 Price-to-Book -0.3374 *** -0.3474 *** 
 
-0.3502 *** -0.3861 *** 
 
-0.3554 
 
-0.3496 
 
 
(0.082) 
 
(0.0824) 
  
(0.0758) 
 
(0.0755) 
  
(0.3125) 
 
(0.3695) 
 Relative Size 0.0304 * 0.0253 
  
0.0091 
 
-0.0068 
  
0.0517 † 0.0626 * 
 
(0.0142) 
 
(0.0192) 
  
(0.0155) 
 
(0.0101) 
  
(0.0263) 
 
(0.0268) 
 Deal Value -0.0001 ** -0.0001 ** 
 
-0.0001 ** -0.0001 *** 
 
-0.0008 
 
-0.0010 
 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
  
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
  
(0.0005) 
 
(0.0007) 
 Percentage 
Acquired 
0.0097 
 
0.0067 
  
-0.0035 
 
0.0079 
  
0.0529 
 
0.0565 
 (0.0174) 
 
(0.0173) 
  
(0.0195) 
 
(0.0187) 
  
(0.0365) 
 
(0.0481) 
 Same Industry -0.0130 
 
-0.0100 
  
-0.0067 
 
0.0001 
  
-0.0287 
 
-0.0327 
 
 
(0.0106) 
 
(0.011) 
  
(0.0117) 
 
(0.0108) 
  
(0.0312) 
 
(0.0299) 
 Prior 
Experience 
-0.0312 ** -0.0298 ** 
 
-0.0271 * -0.0211 * 
 
-0.0298 
 
-0.0381 
 (0.0102) 
 
(0.0103) 
  
(0.0106) 
 
(0.0098) 
  
(0.0272) 
 
(0.0316) 
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Business 
Group 
-0.0205 
 
-0.0197 
  
-0.0034 
 
-0.0075 
  
-0.0841 * -0.0948 * 
(0.0311) 
 
(0.0283) 
  
(0.0158) 
 
(0.0151) 
  
(0.0361) 
 
(0.0387) 
 Inflow/Outflow 0.0020 
 
0.0020 
  
0.0038 
 
-0.0001 
  
-0.0042 
 
-0.0139 
 
 
(0.0085) 
 
(0.0082) 
  
(0.0093) 
 
(0.0092) 
  
(0.0178) 
 
(0.0213) 
 Same 
Language 
0.0252 * 0.0232 * 
 
0.0257 * 0.0240 * 
 
-0.0194 
 
-0.0428 
 (0.0101) 
 
(0.0093) 
  
(0.0112) 
 
(0.0097) 
  
(0.0282) 
 
(0.0308) 
 Forex -0.0539 
 
-0.0189 
  
-0.0213 
 
0.0161 
  
-0.0541 
 
-0.3479 
 
 
(0.1138) 
 
(0.1209) 
  
(0.095) 
 
(0.0975) 
  
(0.3442) 
 
(0.4207) 
 IFDI -0.0004 
 
-0.0004 
  
-0.0009 
 
-0.0012 * 
 
-0.0010 
 
-0.0019 
 
 
(0.0004) 
 
(0.0004) 
  
(0.0006) 
 
(0.0005) 
  
(0.0012) 
 
(0.0017) 
 Constant 0.0519 
 
0.0528 
  
0.0401 
 
0.0436 
  
0.1731 † 0.2577 * 
 
(0.0453) 
 
(0.0438) 
  
(0.0324) 
 
(0.0311) 
  
(0.087) 
 
(0.1106) 
                R-squared 0.459 
 
0.498 
  
0.635 
 
0.714 
  
0.505 
 
0.572 
 Observations 107 
 
107 
  
66 
 
66 
  
39 
 
39 
 Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses, † if p < 0.10, * if p < 0.05; ** if p < 0.01; *** if p < 0.001 
We conducted several robustness checks which are discussed in Appendix A for 
brevity. To summarize, we find support for our hypotheses, i.e., cross-border acquisitions by 
Indian firms significantly benefited from increased legitimacy. Overall, these abnormal 
returns disappear after the initial euphoria created by the Goldman Sachs report, i.e., CARs 
become insignificant after 2006. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
In this article, we look at how a legitimacy-building event can lead to short-term 
euphoria in Indian financial markets and follow-up adjustment in shareholders’ value. As 
cross-border acquisitions imply a trade-off between domestic and foreign investments, with 
effects at a macro level, this is an important avenue for research at a time when many 
emerging markets are experiencing rapid growth (Gubbi et al., 2010).  
In our study, organizational legitimacy is generated at the country level due to 
activities exogenous to individual firms. We argue that the publication of the 2003 Goldman 
Sachs report on BRIC countries was a game-changer for Indian companies in their 
internationalization process (Goldman Sachs, 2003; Rasiah et al., 2010). This report had a 
major impact on reducing the opportunity cost vis-à-vis legitimacy building for these 
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internationalizing firms. Using a large sample of domestic and cross-border acquisitions over 
the period 1999-2009, we find that the legitimacy-building event generated a positive stock 
market expectation about the acquisition performance of Indian multinational companies in 
their foreign investments. In the post-legitimacy period, companies investing abroad 
generated around 4 percent more short-term shareholder returns on average (equivalent to 18 
percent monthly returns) than firms acquiring within their own borders. These post-
legitimacy abnormal returns are mainly driven by euphoria generated around the Goldman 
Sachs report. Indeed, over 2004-2009, overoptimism (measured by trading volume) was 
significantly higher for cross-border acquisitions than domestic acquisitions. By looking at 
cross-border deals only, we are able to investigate the temporal effect of euphoria for Indian 
companies. Consistent with theory, the post-legitimacy euphoria effect emphasized above is 
short-lived, i.e., the overoptimism of investors towards cross-border acquisitions is 
concentrated in the few years after the publication of the Goldman Sachs report (over 2004-
2006) and doesn’t exist outside of this period. Hence, our paper is the first to provide 
empirical evidence on the importance of euphoria in the legitimation process of Indian 
companies undertaking cross-border acquisitions.  
As with any study, this work is not without some limitations. Focusing on publicly 
listed companies implies that our results need to be reflected under the cognizance that 
private firms might have different motivations for acquisitions and experience dissimilar 
results from those observed for public companies. We acknowledge this selection bias in our 
study. Another possible limitation is the event study methodology used. This method has 
been frequently used in other works on international business (Aybar and Ficici, 2009; Gubbi 
et al., 2010), and it focuses on the short-run abnormal share price reaction to acquisition 
announcements. Hence we make the implicit assumption that shareholders are the dominant 
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players who shape and drive strategic choices within a firm and that the stock market is 
efficient, i.e., all information related to the company and its expected future performance is 
incorporated in its stock price (Binder, 1998; Gubbi et al., 2010).  
Our study has implications for practice and research. This paper highlights the 
fickleness of legitimation in foreign acquisitions. The positive value differential generated 
during cross-border acquisitions subsides over a period of time. One possible explanation is 
that as companies struggle to derive value from their foreign investments, the domestic stock 
market becomes skeptical of any future investments abroad. Another explanation is that 
investors reward domestic consolidation after the legitimacy-building event, which signifies 
improvement in firms’ survival rates and financial stability (Goldberg et al., 2000). A third 
explanation is that domestic acquisitions are led by profitable firms and thus stock markets 
predict a potential for transfer of superior corporate governance methods to the acquired 
firms (Gubbi et al., 2010). This explanation corroborates previous empirical evidence (Aybar 
and Ficici, 2009; Dewenter, 1995; Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005). It is also likely that 
these converging returns between domestic and foreign acquisitions are driven by the 
booming domestic market.7 Thus, we argue that although in the short term euphoria creates 
value-enhancing investment opportunities for Indian firms acquiring abroad, in the long term 
rapidly growing domestic sectors are likely to create similar opportunities for value creation 
at home.  
                                                 
7 Sun Life Asset Management Co Ltd’s takeover of Alliance Capital Asset Management (India) Ltd, Punjab 
National Bank’s acquisition of Nedungadi Bank and ICICI bank’s takeover of Tata Finance’s credit card 
portfolio are examples of this effervescent domestic market. Another example in the transportation and logistics 
sector is Gateway Distriparks with several acquisitions between 2004 and 2006. 
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Finally, focusing on Indian bidders to test our hypotheses does not undermine our 
results as India is the biggest market in terms of transactions (especially cross-border deals) 
within emerging economies. An interesting area for future research would be to investigate 
such euphoria effect in countries with similar level of development and international 
exposure like the N-11 countries. Overall, we believe that our research will act as a stepping 
stone for a series of interesting questions and answers in the future.  
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Appendix. Robustness Checks 
Test Outcome 
Alternative proxies for the stock market index: BSE-30 
and BSE-100 market indices  
 Our conclusions remain the 
same.  
Different time windows (3-day and 11-day) (Gubbi et al., 
2010; Miller et al., 2008a) 
Our conclusions remain the 
same. 
The data was screened out for any event where there was 
an overlap between two deal announcements (Gubbi et al., 
2010; McWilliams and Siegel, 1997) 
The analysis of non-
confounding events led to no 
changes in our results 
Alternative industry classification: we reclassified each 
deal using the SIC of bidders and targets. The Same 
Industry variable was equal to one for acquirers and targets 
with the same SIC code. 
Our conclusions remain the 
same. 
Alternate economic and legal institutions variables: Same 
Language was replaced by Legal Distance (highly 
correlated). 
Our conclusions remain the 
same. 
Outliers: we removed outliers from our sample (10% at top 
and bottom end each year). Similarly, we conducted the 
analysis for positive CARs and negative CARs separately. 
Our conclusions remain the 
same. 
Year dummies were added to the cross-sectional 
regressions to control for fixed effects. 
Our results are similar to those 
presented in this paper.  
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